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The intelligence community operates under the microscopes
of numerous oversight groups. The legislative branch, in both the
House and Senate, created a number of committees to oversee and
investigate intelligence agencies. Within the executive branch, the
Director of National Intelligence operates as the head of the
intelligence community and performs the principle advisory
function to the President on matters of national security. The
executive branch also houses the frequently overlooked oversight
body, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB
or the Board). Theoretically, the PFIAB's function is to provide an
additional level of accountability to the intelligence community. In
practice, however, the PFIAB occupies a subdued and infrequently
remarkable position within the advisory and oversight functions of
the government. This article examines the historical impact of the
PFLAB, following its role throughout different administrations. It
then details some of the current shortcomings of the PFIAB and
debates whether the PFLAB should be revamped or discarded.
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WHAT IS THE PFIAB?

Established by President Eisenhower in 1956, the PFIAB is an
executive board that conducts oversight of the intelligence
community. Its members objectively review intelligence activities
by "assess[ing] the quality, quantity, and adequacy of intelligence
collection, of analysis and estimates, and of counterintelligence and
other intelligence activities."'
As an oversight committee, the
PFLAB reviews the activities of each agency involved in intelligence
gathering and reports its findings and recommendations directly to
the President.
This includes examining the "adequacy of
management, personnel and organization" of the agencies, and
advising the President on the effectiveness of the intelligence
community and the legality of activities conducted abroad! To aid
the PFIAB in achieving these goals, members are afforded "access
to all information that the PFIAB deems necessary to carry out its
responsibilities[,]" including access to classified information and
debriefing by CIA officials.'
To be a PFIAB member, one must only be a trustworthy and
distinguished citizen and be appointed by the President.• 4
knowledge of intelligence issues is not a prerequisite.
Each
member serves
S 5 at the pleasure of the President and receives no
compensation. Former chairpersons and members of the PFIAB
include prominent scientists, economists, former military generals,
politicians, ambassadors, and former cabinet members and
directors of intelligence agencies. 6
II. THE PFLAB THROUGHOUT HISTORY
Since the inception of the PFIAB, almost every president has
1. Exec. Order No. 12,863, 3 C.F.R. 632, 632-33 (1994), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. § 401 app. at 64 (2000).
2. Id., reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 app. at 64 (2000)
3. Id.; see also VICTOR MARCHETrl &JOHN D. MARKS, THE CIA AND THE CULT OF
INTELLIGENCE 334 (1974).
4. See Exec. Order No. 12,863, 3 C.F.R. at 632, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401
app. at 63-64 (2000).
5. See id. at 634, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 app. at 64 (2000).
6. For a list of former PFIAB chairpersons, see President's Intelligence
Advisory Board and Intelligence Oversight Board, http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/piab/chairpersons.html
(last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
Edwin Land, a notable member of the PFIAB during President Kennedy's
administration, developed new methods of intelligence gathering through the use
of satellite imagery and the Lockheed U-2 Spy Plane.
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utilized the Board to some degree.
However, the role and
influence of the PFIAB varies by administration.
President
Eisenhower created the PFIAB under the name President's Board
of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities as a response to
problems with the Nation's foreign intelligence gathering.7
President Kennedy's relationship with the PFIAB remained strong
during his tenure. While the Executive Order required only semiannual meetings, the Board met almost weekly, with President
Kennedy often seeking advice. After the Bay of Pigs Invasion in
1961, President Kennedy asked the PFIAB to assist in an attempt to
reorganize the intelligence community, yet the PFIAB's efforts were
largely ignored.9 President Kennedy also utilized the PFIAB during
this time to seek recommendations regarding domestic spying
activities of a New York Times reporter. 1° Overall, of the PFJAB's 170
submitted recommendations to the President, 125 gained approval
and only two were rejected, making President Kennedy's utilization
of the PFIAB the most substantial since 1956.1"
President Johnson continued to draw upon the PFIAB; later,
President Nixon formally expanded the Board's
reach from foreign
• • • 12
intelligence activities to all CIA activities.
Thus, the PFIAB
assumed a more active role in the Nixon administration. 3 In 1975,
the Rockefeller Report concluded that the PFIAB's functions
should be expanded to include CIA oversight. To that end, the
PFLAB suggested that President Ford employ a "competitive
analysis" comparing the CIA's conclusions of Soviet capacity in
7. See Exec. Order No. 10,656, 3 C.F.R. 300 (1954-1958); Judith Miller,
Advisory and Oversight Panels on Intelligence Named, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1981, at A27.
8.

See NORMAN POLMAR & THOMAS B. ALLEN, Spy BOOK: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

ESPIONAGE 516 (2d ed. 2004); see also CHRISTOPHER ANDREW, FOR THE PRESIDENT'S
EYES ONLY: SECRET INTELLIGENCE AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY FROM WASHINGTON

TO BUSH 272 (1995).
9. MARCHETrI & MARKS, supranote 3, at 335.
10.
See Tim Weiner, J.FK Turns to the C.I.A. to Plug a Leak, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
2007, § 4, at 47.
11.
POLMAR & ALLEN, supranote 8, at 516.
12. Compare Exec. Order No. 10,938, 3 C.F.R. 469, with Exec. Order No.
11,460, 3 C.F.R. 782 (1966-1970).
13. Stephen J. Flanagan, Managing the Intelligence Community, 10 INT'L
SECURITY58, 70 (1985).

14. President Ford established the Rockefeller Commission to examine
domestic activities of the CIA and determine whether abuse of power was
occurring. See COMMISSION ON CIA AcrTIVvES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, REPORT
TO
THE
PRESIDENT
271
(1975),
available
at
http://wv.aarclibrary.org/publib/contents/church/contents-church-reports_r
ockcomm.htm.
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1975 against non-CIA analysts' conclusions.' 5 President Carter
abolished the PFLAB in 1977.16 By this time, other committees
provided the advisory function necessary for the intelligence
community, making the role of the PFIAB superfluous and an17
obstacle to direct contact between the President and the CIA.
Additionally, President Carter did not approve of the PFIAB's
support for the covert and clandestine activities of the CIA."
President Reagan pledged in his presidential campaign to reestablish the PFIAB and did so in 1981. 9 President Reagan's PFIAB
totaled twenty-one members, including some of his long-time
friends. That number fell drastically in 1985 when President
Reagan dismissed eleven members, citing the need to streamline
the Board and focus on critical intelligence problems. 2° This
streamlining effort was met with skepticism, as the resulting
political balance of the PFIAB shifted in favor of then-Vice
President Bush.21 In 1985, the PFIAB prepared a report, noting the
vulnerability of the U.S. embassy in Moscow, prompting a plan to
reduce Soviet Union employees at the facility. Overall, President
Reagan's PFIAB "held considerable power in intelligence
matters[,]" but all of this changed under President George H. W.
Bush, who decreased the influence of the Board.2 "
President Clinton officially merged the PFIAB with the
15. Flanagan, supra note 13, at 70-71. This Team A/Team B structure
required Team A, CIA analysts, and Team B, a group of specialized experts, to
provide a retrospective analysis of Soviet strength using the information available
to the CIA at the time of the CIA's initial estimate. See JOHN RAuNELAGH, THE
AGENCY: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE CIA 623-24 (1987).
16. See Exec. Order No. 11,984, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 403 app. at 76 (2000).
At that time, the PFIAB and the Intelligence Oversight Board were separate
entities.
17. See Flanagan, supra note 13, at 71.
18. RANELAGH, supra note 15, at 662; see also POLMAR & ALLEN, supra note 8, at
516.
19. See Exec. Order No. 12,331, 3 C.F.R. 197 (1982); Miller, supra note 7, at
A27.
20.

Peter T. Kilborn, Reagan Drops 11 in Foreign Policy Advisory Group, N.Y.

TIMES, Nov. 5, 1985, at Al5 ("[T]he group had become an unwieldy 'monstrosity,'
and . . . 'strife ridden and contentious. There were many people who normally
disagreed so much it became useless ....
21. Id.
22. Stephen Engelberg, Reagan Was Told in '85 of Problem in Moscow Embassy,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1987, at Al. Ross Perot allegedly resigned from the PFIAB
because of the administration's failure to comply with the Board's
recommendations. Id.
23. Michael Wines, Bush to Streamline Advisory Panel on Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 1990, atA9.
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Intelligence Oversight Board, and set the number of members at
24
sixteen; not surprisingly, many personal friends became members.
During the recent Bush administration, the PFIAB operated in the
same fashion as in previous years, with the President issuing a new
25
In 2003, the PFIAB
Executive Order late in his presidency.
reviewed President Bush's apparently false comments in a State of
the Union address concerning Iraq's alleged attempts to obtain
Surprisingly, President Bush did
nuclear materials from Africa.
not utilize the PFIAB to examine the CIA intelligence which led to
the war in Iraq.27 With President28Obama now in the White House,
the fate of the PFIAB is unknown.
III.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE

PFJAB

The intelligence community requires a certain amount of
oversight to remain objective and improve its performance. The
PFIAB's current ability to contribute to this oversight function is
limited, due to a structure that does not insulate the Board from
political pressures, gives no incentive to participate, and creates
tensions between members and the intelligence community. First,
PFLAJB members are not required to meet on a regular basis.
Depending on the administration, the Board may meet weekly or
every few months. Until President Bush's recent order, PFIAB
members could also serve in other areas of the government,
leading to a split focus or disinterested members. Furthermore, its
volunteer-type membership offers no incentive for in-depth work.
Overall, PFIAB members may not offer the level of attention

24. See Exec. Order No. 12,863, 3 C.F.R. 632, 632-33 (1993), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. § 401 app. at 63-64 (2000); see DouglasJehl, Elite Intelligence Panel Is Refilled,
in Usual Way, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993, § 1, at 28 ("That is what makes a place on
... Board ... perhaps the plummiest of all White House appointmentsthe
and a post that often lands in the hands of those to whom Presidents and their

parties owe favors.").
25. See Exec. Order No. 13,462, 73 Fed. Reg. 11,805 (Feb. 29, 2008).
President Bush changed the Board's name to "President's Intelligence Advisory
Board." Id.
26. See Walter Pincus, White House Faulted on Uranium Claim, WASH. POST, Dec.
24, 2003, at A01.
27.

Editorial, Reviewing the Intelligence on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2003, at A14.

28. But see Change.gov, Obama announces Panetta and Blair for Intel Posts,
http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/obamaannouncespanetta-andblair fori
ntelposts/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2009) (noting that former Director of National
Intelligence, Mike McConnell, is slated for a position on President Obama's
"Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board").
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required to effectively oversee intelligence activities and
satisfactorily advise the President."
Second, those appointed to the Board are often friends of the
President-not individuals able to make an intelligible evaluation
of the various intelligence agencies.3 0 Indeed, the PFIAB is often
comprised of persons more qualified to make business assessments
as opposed to intelligence assessments. This haphazard and
undefined method of choosing members also raises partisanship
concerns because an incoming President can hand-pick the PFlAB
in accordance with that administration's views. As such, members
may be unwilling to criticize the administration and propose hardline changes to the conduct of intelligence activities."
Additionally, this constant rotation suggests the PFIAB lacks the
stability and experience needed
to be an effective participant in
32
overall intelligence oversight.
A final critique of the Board's structure concerns the tense
relationship between the PFLAB and the intelligence community.
Because its members have access to all information the PFIAB
deems relevant, the Board can be an annoyance to those officials
charged with sharing important intelligence with the members. 3
29.

See AM. BAR ASS'N: WORKING GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT AND

ACCOUNTABILITY, OVERSIGHT

AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF

THE U.S.

INTELLIGENCE

AGENCIES:
AN
EVALUATION
108
(1985)
[hereinafter OVERSIGHT AND
ACCOUNTABILITY]; MARCHETTI & MARKS, supra note 3, at 334 (discussing the PFIAB

in the 1970s). "The PFIAB meets approximately once a month in Washington,
and is thus of limited value as a permanent watchdog committee." Id.; see also
David Everett Colton, Comment, Speaking Truth to Power: Intelligence Oversight in an
Imperfect World, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 571, 611 n.177 (1988) (citing Martin Anderson,
Through the Looking Glass, COMMON CAUSE MAG.,July-Aug. 1988, at 13, 16).
30. Seejehl, supranote 24, § 1, at 28; Miller, supra note 7, at A27.
31.

See OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 29, at 72.

If one examines the membership of the [PFIAB], and the manner in
which some of its members are chosen, one will see that it represents...
(a) a patronage system to reward those who have been helpful to the
party in power; (b) and kind of "Old Guard" membership who do not
seem likely to raise fundamental questions that would help evaluate the
quality of the system.
Id.; see also Robert Bryce, Top-Secret Cronies, SALON.COM, Nov. 17, 2005,
http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2005/ll/17/pfiab
(suggesting that
former chairman Brent Scowcroft's dismissal stemmed from his open criticism of
President Bush's handling of Iraq).
32.
See MARK M. LOWENTHAL, U.S. INTELLIGENCE: EVOLUTION AND ANATOMY 143
(2d ed. 1992).
33. SeeJehl, supra note 24, § 1, at 28 ("All this hunger for information is a
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Suggestions by the PFLAB may also be met with cynicism by those
with the ability to make changes. This problem is intensified due
to the lack of intelligence know-how on the Board.
Even with a vibrant roster, the PFIAB still requires specific
responsibilities to be useful. The prominence of the PFLAB varies
throughout history, with some administrations demonstrating the
Board's usefulness, and others highlighting its superfluous nature.
The President has many advisors to turn to, including those directly
involved in intelligence matters.34 As of now, the PFLAB's role is
limited to researching and reporting-its members cannot employ
innovative techniques, such as the Team A/Team B exercise,
without presidential approval. As such, the ability of the PFIAB to
offer oversight and review beyond the measures already in place by
other legislative and executive groups is doubtful.
IV. Is REFORM POSSIBLE?
Reforming the Board's structure may lead to more
effectiveness and give the group legitimacy in the intelligence
community, but such changes raise a host of new concerns. By
assembling full-time positions and providing compensation,
members may have the time and incentive to research and issue
thorough advice.315 Creating measures to further insulate the Board
from partisan politics is also necessary. 36
Permanent and
overlapping membership positions with each administration may
counteract possible partisanship and prevent the President from
dismissing those with unpopular ideas.3 7 To be truly valuable,
however, the PFIAB should be comprised of members who are
familiar with intelligence matters.
These needed reforms highlight another critical element in
source of frustration for professional intelligence officers, who must brief
members of the panel on closely held government secrets.").
34. See LOWErNTHAL, supra note 32, at 143 (the "PFIAB's purely advisory role
inherently limits its influence on intelligence policy...").
35. See OVERSIGHT AND AccouNTABILITY, supra note 29, at 76. Adding more
employees to the government's payroll may be unwise in these economic times.
36. Id. at 35. Many responses noted a difference between being non-partisan
and non-political, stating that policy formation is a function of politics and thus
inherent in oversight. Id. at 35-38; see also Flanagan, supranote 13, at 72 ("Thus, if
. . . composed of individuals from across the political spectrum with broad
experience in intelligence and foreign affairs, the PFIAB could be a useful asset
for a President inclined to use it constructively.").
37. OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 29, at 108; see Bryce, supra
note 31.
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intelligence oversight: maintaining distance to avoid diversion or
becoming too empathetic with those being observed. Members
who know enough about intelligence issues to make quality
assessments may be hesitant to critique friends, former co-workers,
and other acquaintances. Additionally, one aspect of the PFLAB
that cannot be modified is its need for unrestricted access to
classified information. Such information is critical to ensuring top
performance. However, great risks are involved when another
group of individuals becomes privy to the Nation's top secrets,
especially those not in the public eye or subject to the public's
approval. Overall, it is unclear whether the benefits to changing
the PFIAB's membership charter outweigh the obvious risks.
Expanding the PFLAB's mandate to include new tasks may
further tangle the intelligence community and encroach on other
oversight bodies. The 9/11 Commission Report suggested the
existence of an executive board, or an expansion of existing boards
(likely the PFLAB), to "oversee adherence to the [recommended]
guidelines.., and the
commitment
the government makes to
..- •
,,39
defend our civil liberties.
However, this possible expansion was
delegated to a newly created oversight board.4' A recent report on
the PFLAB argues that the Board should focus primarily on forwardlooking tasks, such as "anticipating future technological trends or
political developments" or providing "early warnings to the
[P]resident and the intelligence community. 4 Yet appointing the
PFIAB this line of responsibilities does not alleviate the need for
more knowledgeable members and ignores the presence of
numerous oversight boards already engaged in this undertaking.42
38. See Jonathan Weisman, Bush Adviser Helped Law Firm Land Job Lobbying for
CNOOC, WASH. POST, July 12, 2005, at DOI. This article raised a concern with
James Langdon's dual role as chairman of the PFIAB and his trips to China to
"help secure his law firm's role in lobbying for a state-run Chinese energy firm and
its bid for ...

Unocal Corp." Id.

39.

THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 395 (2004), available

at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/sec12.pdf.
40. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, § 1061, 118 Stat. 3638.
41. KENNETH MICHAEL ABSHER ET AL., CONFIDENTIAL AND PRIVILEGED: THE
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN IN'ELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD, LEARNING LESSONS FROM ITS
PAST
TO
SHAPE
ITS
FuTURE
19
(2008),
available
at

http://www.georgebushfoundation.org/uploads/files/PFIAB%2OReport.pdf.
42. See Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Architecture of Snmart Intelligence:Structuring
and OverseeingAgencies in the Post-9/1 1 World, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1655, 1662-64 (2006)
(discussing the functions of congressional oversight bodies).
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While the PFIAB may be in a unique position to tackle these tasks
in the executive branch, the necessary reforms will essentially
transform the PFIAB into a twin of already-existing oversight
committees.
Likewise, any propositions for expansion must take care to
avoid the potential for undue interference with intelligence
agencies.
With the recent revamping of the intelligence
community after 9/11, additional levels of management and
bureaucracy may prove more harmful than beneficial.
Thus,
substantive additions to the PFIAB's protocol may actually be
detrimental and constitute another burden in the already evolving
intelligence community.
V.

CONCLUSION

With a new administration in the White House, now is the
perfect time either to institute needed reform or to recognize that
others are in a better position to advise the President on such
sensitive matters.
Today, the PFIAB's role in overseeing the
intelligence community and advising the President is low-key and
lackluster.
Many reforms are needed to make the PFIAB a true
contributor. The method of selecting members must be changed,
as should the qualifications for service on the Board. Also, the
PFLAB should be given specific mandates and tasks, whether it be
reviewing intelligence mishaps or looking into the future. But
overall, the risks and possible detriments associated with
revitalizing the Board must be balanced against its real potential to
be a unique oversight body.

43. But see ABSHER ET AL., supra note 41, at 2-3 for the proposition that the
PFIAB's low profile is due to the "sensitivity of the issues it considered" and
executive privilege.
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